Given
that the claims of continuity have already been debunked and the ideal of a
universal Western warrior has been demystified, the next step is to address
Hanson’s claims of uniqueness and the dichotomy he posits between West and
East. In essence, Hanson’s argument reeks of Orientalism because of its
essentialist and reductionist components. For Hanson and contemporaries like
Keegan, the otherization of the East functions both to subjugate the East and
to reflexively self-define the West. In this sense, the East is definitionally
antithetic to the West; it substantiates the West’s self-understanding of
itself as structured and modernized through the East’s own apparent
backwardness. Intrinsic to
this process, the European attitude toward the Orient[1]
consciously underscores attributes that differentiate the two artificially
constructed polarities (East and West), “exil[ing] the Orient into an irretrievable
state of otherness.” Kegan goes as far as to describe all “Oriental” military
cultures as being characterized by evasion, delay, and indirectness. The flaws
of this over-generalization are not solely due to an innocent lack of knowledge
about Eastern culture, but also can be attributed to overlooking certain
Western tendencies. For instance, many armies in the 16th century
were indirect in that they were battle averse and even Sir Basil Henry Liddell
Hart, someone who had a large influence on Western military tradition, openly
advocated an indirect approach. Drawing upon Gramsci’s theories about hegemony
and Foucault’s postulations about the relationship between discourse, knowledge
and power, Edward Said aptly demonstrates how the Orientalist trap can
guarantee the sustenance of a system in which the West exercises hegemony over
the Orient; as Said explains, Orientalism is a “Western style of dominating,
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. Said’s theories of
Orientalism help to explain how the unrivaled dominance of the West has been
solidified in the modern era and accounts for Hanson, Parker, and Keegan’s
unapologetic, albeit nuanced, Western triumphalism.
Hence, Hanson’s argument is rooted in an
ignorance of non-Western warfare. First and foremost, the claim that Eastern
armies did not have the same discipline as those of the West as a result of
some cultural feature is sheer naivety. During the Warring States period
(403-221 BC) in China, rival Chinese rulers formed huge disciplined armies of
conscripted subjects. Several Chinese writers of that period such as Han
Fei-Tzu, and Ying Shao also frequently commented on the need for discipline,
indicating that this was not a unique Western cultural feature; Chu-ko Liang
(181-243 AD) even advocated a five-step training program to create a
disciplined army. Also, the coordination of several weapons and warriors using
bows, crossbows, spears, and halberds in close order while marching suggests
expertise that could have only come as a result of drill.
Examples from the Warring States period
also debunk Hanson’s claims about capitalism. During this period, polities
fielded up to 600,000 troops and equipped them effectively with weapons and
armor of the highest order. The same holds true for Vedic India and the
campaigns of the Mughals under Aurangzeb, who campaigned with an army several thousand
strong around the year 177. It is also important to note here the diversity of
such forces in East Asia and South Asia in terms of differing moral codes, use
of elephants, and varying degrees of infantry usage according to preferences
and customs of each individual polity in question. Although the exact quality
of arms cannot be ascertained, Asian, especially Chinese, technology was quite
advanced as evidenced by excellent samurai swords, seagoing vessels, and
ironworks. At this juncture, Hanson might reiterate that these societies could
have never produced on the same scale as the West. But in light of the size of
the armies indicated above and the fact that these were the times in which the
Great Wall was built, is it that unbelievable that a system other than
capitalism succeeded?
Another manner in which Hanson
essentializes the Oriental “Other” is in regard to the concepts of legal
freedom and separation of politics from religion, which he claims to be
hallmarks of Western culture. However, for the Greeks, politics and religion
were far from separate and freedom was often deified in and of itself. The
poleis were rife with religious rituals; in fact, the Spartans did not arrive
at Marathon in time for the battle because of an elaborate religious ritual.
Also, all of these city-states relied on the advice of oracles and priests and
engaged in ceremonial public worship. The Athenians worshipped the concept of
freedom as part of the cult of Zeus Eleutherios; as Hanson oddly admits, “deities
did more for the average Athenian than Ahura Mazda had ever done for the
Persian subject.” Further, Hanson ignores the way in which secular ideology can
be just as deadly as a force of religion and the similarity between the Puritan
spirit that drove America to victory over the British and the moral codes of
Islam. The argument about secular oversight of the military completely overlooks
how figures ranging from Alexander to Augustus were deified.
Despite his proclivity toward Western
triumphalism, Hanson’s thesis is certainly worth consideration and, for the
most part, his scholarship is of the highest caliber. Unfortunately, he falls victim
to overgeneralization and ends up with too many inconsistencies and
inaccuracies as a result of distortion and omission. The cultural approach is
certainly viable and perhaps the most important lens through which to view the
history of warfare, but should not function as a vindication of Western
hegemony. “In [Hanson’s] interpretation, [he] combines two visions of the West
that have themselves been at war during the last 30 years: the celebration of
the West for its democratic vision…and the condemnation of the West for
militarism…the tendency is to see these positions as incompatible.” To
contravene this tendency would truly require history to be written (or rather,
rewritten) by Victor.
*Citations omitted
[1] It should be noted that European and American audiences interpret
the term “Orient” differently. The “Orient” for Europe is more commonly
associated with the Near East, or the totality of non-Western society, whereas the
term’s semiotic extension in the West is more often associated with the Far
East.
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